Active Viewership and Ethical Representation: Responsible Spectatorship in Alfredo Jaar’s “Real Pictures” and Gil Courtemanche’s Un dimanche à la piscine à Kigali by Ritter, Angela
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXIV, No 1 (2016)  |  www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2016.712 
 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No 
Derivative Works 3.0 United States License. 
 
This journal is operated by the University Library System of the University of Pittsburgh 
as part of its D-Scribe Digital Publishing Program, and is co-sponsored by the 
University of Pittsburgh Press 
   
Active Viewership and Ethical 
Representation: Responsible 
Spectatorship in Alfredo Jaar’s “Real 
Pictures” and Gil Courtemanche’s Un 
dimanche à la piscine à Kigali 
Angela Ritter 
 
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy - Revue de la philosophie française et de 
langue française, Vol XXIV, No 1 (2016) 205-223.   
 
Vol XXIV, No 1 (2016) 
ISSN 1936-6280 (print) 
ISSN 2155-1162 (online) 
DOI 10.5195/jffp.2016.712 
www.jffp.org 
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXIV, No 1 (2016)  |  www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2016.712 
Active Viewership and Ethical 
Representation  
Responsible Spectatorship in Alfredo Jaar’s “Real 
Pictures” and Gil Courtemanche’s Un dimanche à la 
piscine à Kigali 
Angela Ritter 
University of North Carolina, Chapel HIll 
In its discussion of Gil Courtemanche’s Un dimanche à la piscine à Kigali and 
Alfredo Jaar’s installation of “Real Pictures,” both of which are 
representations of the Rwandan Genocide, this analysis contributes to a 
larger discussion on ethical representations of violence. Generally the 
discussion of the ethics of representation analyzes the ways in which the 
author or artist portrays the violent events. It focuses on the importance of 
the historical and political context when describing the events, as well as on 
the ways in which the author or artist avoids the potential objectifying or 
dehumanizing effects of representations on the victims, as well as, the 
perpetrators. This article highlights another important element to be 
considered in the study of ethical representations- that of how the reader is 
engaged in the representation and as a result may or may not contribute to 
stereotypes, objectification, and other negative consequences possible when 
representing violence. Those who represent violence must not only consider 
ethical implications with their own interactions with the event and text or 
image, but also how they encourage their audience to interact with them.     
While the Rwandan Genocide was virtually absent from the news 
during the months of violence in the spring of 1994, there have since been 
many photos, films, books and news reports representing the atrocities- one 
could even claim an inundation of representations of the genocide. 
However, often film, literary, media, and photographic representations of 
the Rwandan genocide do not reveal the full complexity of the events; they 
simplify the realities of the genocide and often work to further degrade and 
victimize the Rwandans implicated. This can be especially true in visual 
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representations of genocide such as photos portrayed by the media or in 
artistic representations.  
Visual depictions of the violence create the understanding that 
Western audiences possess of genocide, and they too often reduce the 
complexity of the situation and even hide the truth behind the events from 
the viewers. Baudrillard aptly explains the power of the image in the post-
modern world: “Habituellement, dans notre univers médiatique, l’image est 
là à la place de l’événement. Elle s’y substitue, et la consommation de 
l’image épuise l’événement par procuration.” “Usually, in our media-
centered world, the image is there in place of the event. It substitutes itself 
for the event, and the consumption of the image wears out the event by 
proxy.”1 This replacement of the event by the representations of the event 
can be dangerous both for the viewers who accept the portrayal of victims 
and aggressors, and for the victims themselves who are often further 
degraded.  Too often representations of genocide in the media are limited to 
obscene, degrading, and objectifying images, thus rendering the event itself 
a spectacle. While these representations are not necessarily inaccurate, they 
do provide a limited view of genocide and of the people associated with the 
events, which can conceptually transform people into objects. This 
transformation is unethical in nature, perpetuates the stereotypes and biases 
that fuel hatred and violence, and is the very essence of what 
representations should try to avoid. Yet, often photographers, journalists, 
artists and writers fall short in their responsibility to ethically represent the 
violence witnessed. 
In his November 1994 article Un génocide sans images. Blancs filment 
Noirs. published in Le Monde Diplomatique, Edgar Roskis, a French journalist, 
discusses the questionable choices of journalists and photographers as they 
seek to get their “shot”. In his article he offers specific examples of 
photographers and journalists unethically representing the genocide, and 
even purposefully exploiting the situation and images in order to profit. 
Among these examples he includes a quotation from a fellow French 
journalist Jean-Michel Turpin of the Gamma agency. Turpin was in Zaire at 
the end of the genocide taking photographs of Rwandan refugees along with 
many other journalists. He personally regretted a photo that he took, and in 
the following citation he further laments the challenges of photographers 
and the tendency to go too far: 
Writers can do their jobs more discreetly, but when you work with a 
camera, you have to get up very close to your subjects and look them in the 
face. You have to get into some positions that are going to be grotesque…I 
saw a photographer who was almost sitting on top of a dead child to get a 
shot. He obviously hadn't realized it, but at that point, I had had enough.2  
Roskis supports his colleague’s concerns about unethical choices of 
journalists and chooses to incorporate the quote into his article to express 
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multiple, similar perspectives. He goes further in discussing the exploitative 
measures taken as he explains that the majority of the images engraved in 
Western memory of the Rwandan genocide were actually taken from Zaire 
in the safe humanitarian zone created by the French.  
[This gave] photo stylists and other photo award hunters [a] 
convenient location where they could instantly access an 
inexhaustible supply of the raw materials they need to produce 
images of Africa for Western consumption: large anonymous 
groups of people floating through ethereal clouds of dust; the 
beautiful bodies of the ill and injured; the wide, imploring eyes of 
children; infants latched on to their mother’s empty- or with a bit of 
luck, her dead- breast.3  
Roskis refers to journalists and photographers as “photo award hunters” in 
order to emphasize profiteering behaviors. He discusses the images in terms 
of consumption in order to underline the unethical use of the images. Also, 
Roskis gives examples of the types of photos that were being taken while 
illuminating the exploitative, de-humanizing ways in which people take and 
show pictures of violence. Furthermore, Roskis equates the representation of 
genocide to a marketplace and in so doing implies questionable ethics. With 
these commentaries on photography following the Rwandan genocide, he 
also participates in a larger discussion of how violence should be captured 
and portrayed. Yet, the shock value goal of photography has been fully 
embraced both by media and by NGOs because it sells to the general public. 
Also, Roskis questions the ultimate effectiveness of the images in 
representing the genocide. While obscene, pornographic-like4 images gain 
attention because they shock the public, he argues that “at best these images 
of the dead and dying attract our charity. They don't keep us from living or 
even from sleeping at night.”5 Roskis questions the efficacy in the 
representations of genocide and highlights the continued indifference of the 
international public. As a journalist himself, he does place significant 
responsibility on the role of the media in shaping public opinion, and it 
seems that in the case of Rwanda there was a failure to justly represent the 
violence. Susan Sontag, who is not a journalist but a human rights activist, 
an author, and a literary critic who has done significant research on 
representations of suffering and violence, shares a similar perspective to 
Roskis about the important role that media holds in our society but also the 
ineffectiveness of its representations. She describes photographs as a “means 
of making ‘real’ (or ‘more real’) matters that the privileged and the merely 
safe might prefer to ignore”6, thus insinuating their illuminating importance. 
Yet, she also acknowledges that the desired response of viewers is not 
attained- instead the images are dismissed and people continue on with 
their lives. Sontag echoes Virginia Woolf’s perspective on the people’s 
failure to respond to the images: it is not because we are “moral monsters” 
but rather, “our failure is one of imagination, of empathy: we have failed to 
2 0 8  |  A c t i v e  V i e w e r s h i p  a n d  E t h i c a l  R e p r e s e n t a t i o n  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXIV, No 1 (2016)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2016.712 
hold this reality (the war, violence, or suffering) in mind”7. If the inaction is 
a result of a failure of imagination and empathy, then representations must 
strive to engage their viewer/reader’s in such a way that this does not occur, 
which is exactly what Jaar and Courtemanche do. 
Many journalists including Edgar Roskis, Jean-Michel Turpin, and 
Tom Giles, who wrote for BBC, condemn the ways in which the genocide in 
Rwanda was, and was not8, represented in the media. They join their voices 
with literary critics such as Susan Sontag, Edward Said, or Cecile Lavergne 
who question the ethical implications in how images and texts portray 
suffering and marginalized groups of people in literature and art. However, 
it is not only the authors and artists who represent the violence that run the 
risk of further objectifying the people they discuss. The readers and viewers 
can also participate in dehumanization because of the way in which they 
interact with the representations. Therefore, when considering ethical 
representations of violence it is important to also consider the role of the 
reader. This is a difficult task as each reader may relate differently to a text. 
However, it is beneficial to analyze the ways in which the representations 
do, or do not, seek to include the viewer or reader in the process of 
understanding, as well as how the representation encourages the reader or 
audience to interact with the event and/or people. This is a new dimension 
to the studies of ethical representation: the artist, writer, journalist not only 
has to be aware and cautious of how he depicts violence, victims, 
perpetrators, etc. but is also ethically implored to consider the strategies he 
uses to implicate the reader and encourage ethical spectatorship.  
Alfredo Jaar and Gil Courtemanche both exemplify this aspect of 
ethical representation as they require the reader to interact with the subject 
of genocide with compassion and honest reflection regarding the complexity 
of the events as well as the failure of humanity at multiple levels. Neither 
Jaar nor Courtemanche allow their audience to retain a distant, detached, or 
arrogant position regarding the violence that tore apart a nation and killed 
hundreds of thousands of people.   
Alfredo Jaar is a Chilean photographer who travelled to Rwanda 
directly after the genocide in order to gather eye-witness accounts and 
document photographically what had occurred. After his return from 
Rwanda, he created many different photographic installations about 
Rwanda and the genocide, none of which would be considered traditional. 
He found creative ways to handle the challenges around representing such 
violence, challenges such as whether the image further dehumanizes the 
victim, or if by taking the photo the photographer participates in the 
exploitation of the “other”. His “Real Pictures” installation in Chicago in 
January 1995 was a creative and poignant response to these ethical 
dilemmas: he actually chose not to use his photographs in his installation. 
While Jaar was in Rwanda he snapped thousands of pictures, but in this first 
installation not one of the photographs was seen by the viewers because he 
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was so dissatisfied with the limitations of the photographs to portray what 
he saw, heard, and experienced there. Even when taking the photos he 
struggled as he felt that he could not do justice to what he was seeing and 
hearing. Upon his return he continued to wrestle with how to best use his 
images in representation of the genocide. Jaar is quoted in Ruben Gallo’s 
article Representation of Violence, Violence of Representation where he admits 
the challenges he faced in Rwanda as he tried to capture all he saw:   
For me, what was important was to record everything I saw around 
me, and to do this as methodically as possible. In these 
circumstances a ‘good photograph’ is a picture that comes as close 
as possible to reality. But the camera never manages to record what 
your eyes se, or what you feel at the moment. The camera always 
creates a new reality. I have always been concerned with the 
disjunction between experience and what can be recorded 
photographically. In the case of Rwanda, the disjunction was 
enormous and the tragedy un-representable. This is why it was so 
important for me to speak with people, to record their words, their 
ideas, their feelings. I discovered that the truth of the tragedy was 
in the feelings, words, and ideas of those people, and not in the 
pictures.9  
Jaar took thousands of pictures but was displeased with his inability to 
capture the extent of the suffering and the humanity of the victims and 
aggressors. He did not want to be reductionist in his representation like so 
many others have been, and so he chose not to exhibit his work.  
Stéphane Audouin-Rouzeau, in his article Violences extrêmes de combat 
et refus de voir, speaks positively regarding Jaar’s choice not to display his 
images from Rwanda in the 1995 installation. He praises the choice as an 
implicitly moral decision as he discusses the perils of voyeurism and the 
spectacle of violence.  
N’est-ce pas, au moins en filigrane, le péril de voyeurisme dont on 
paraît se méfier, la jouissance toujours possible face au spectacle de 
la violence et de son érotisation ? L’étude de la violence de combat 
se situerait-elle du côté de l’exhibitionnisme, de l’obscénité, voire 
de la perversité toujours à redouter de la part de celui qui la 
dévoile, par la parole ou par l’écriture ? Auquel cas, le refus de voir 
s’adosserait à une posture implicitement moralisatrice.10  
Is it not, at least implicitly, the peril of voyeurism that we seem to 
mistrust, the pleasure always possible in face of the spectacle of 
violence and its eroticization? The study of combat violence is 
situated next to exhibitionism, obscenity, or even the perversity 
that is always feared by that which unveils it through words or 
writing. In which case, the refusal to see would back up against an 
implicitly moral posture.   
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Rouzeau claims that the best choice in facing ethical questions of 
representation is to refuse to look at the degrading images. He situates the 
study of violence next to exhibitionism, and thus believes that seeing is 
always a voyeuristic act. Contrary to Rouzeau, I would argue that while 
observing representations of violence can be voyeuristic in nature, refusing 
to look at and acknowledge the suffering that occurs is a limited solution. 
There is value to the sharing and preservation of stories. This importance of 
witnessing, and the healing aspect involved, is denied if there is an 
unwilling audience. This, thus, begs the question of how one sees and does 
so ethically. In addition to concern on the part of the author, photographer, 
journalist, etc. to responsibly portray the violence, Rouzeau implicitly 
suggests the importance of a conscientious viewer or reader who refuses to 
fall prey to the exhibitionist shock of violence portrayed or to be part of an 
objectification or dehumanization of victims. 
  Jaar wanted to avoid rendering the genocide into a spectacle of 
images, thus dehumanizing the victims portrayed, but he was also greatly 
concerned with the lack of effectiveness of images in stirring empathetic 
responses. He lamented the inaction of people after seeing the images 
during the genocide and wondered how he could inspire a different 
response. Roland Barthes explains the erosion of power and effectiveness in 
images and representations by suggesting that “it is not enough to signify 
the horrible for us to experience it.”11 Here Barthes touches on a significant 
aspect of the challenge of representation: active verse passive responses. 
Seeing does not guarantee imagining, empathizing, or truly witnessing.  
From the same standpoint, David Levi Strauss complements Barthes 
argument in discussing the difference between active and passive roles of 
interacting with a representation, and too often viewers remain passive. He 
explains that in these cases the images of violence and suffering intend to 
convey horror but fail to do so:   
As we look at them, we are in each case dispossessed of our own 
judgment: someone has shuddered for us, reflected for us, judged 
for us; the photographer has left us nothing- except a simple right 
of intellectual acquiescence…such images do not compel us to 
action, but to acceptance. The action has already been taken, and 
we are not implicated.12  
If the action is already completed as Strauss discusses - the action being to 
determine a point of view, decide what is important, or frame the 
understanding of the event- then the viewer, or reader, is unnecessary and 
can feel distant and irrelevant. This allows for the viewer to take a passive 
role, show limited concern, and continue on with life as if nothing has 
happened. Unfortunately, this is contrary to the intended aims of the 
representations, which are to bear witness, to bring political action, to ensure 
such suffering is not repeated. Yet, as Strauss explains, too often 
A n g e l a  R i t t e r  |  2 1 1  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXIV, No 1 (2016)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2016.712 
representations call for a passive position of the viewer in which he is able to 
remain distant from the atrocities witnessed.  
Jaar requires an active position of the viewer as he does not display his 
photographs in his 1995 installation “Real Pictures” but rather only offers 
the viewer his captions for the photos. By hiding the images he forces the 
viewers to imagine the graphic scenes that Jaar had seen, which forces them 
out of passivity. The act of imagining also necessitates an element of 
responsibility for what they have imagined, how they have imagined it, and 
how they reflect upon it. When someone walked into his installation they 
would not see a single photograph but rather in their place would see stacks 
of boxes with captions written on top of them. Jaar “buries” sixty carefully 
chosen images in the black linen boxes. These boxes are silk-screened in 
white with descriptions of the images that are hidden inside. They are then 
stacked and arranged into monuments of different sizes. Jaar places 
emphasis on the experience of the viewer who has to carefully read each 
description and imagine not only the photograph but also the situation, the 
lives, and deaths of the people. The effect of the exhibit is “funereal” and the 
“silence of the gallery is deafening.”13 Jaar encourages a relationship 
between the viewer and the event such that the person is emotionally 
affected and moved to empathize with the victims. This is a very different 
outcome than that against which Strauss, Barthes, and Jaar speak. Strauss 
asserts that “images of suffering and misery elsewhere in the world are used 
as reminders of what we are free from.”14 Yet, Jaar refuses the safety of 
distancing oneself from the image seen as he never actually shows the 
image.    
In addition to photography and journalism, questions of 
representation and witnessing are relevant issues addressed in French and 
Francophone literary studies. The study of representations of violence draws 
from these same journalistic questions of the consumption of images, the 
creation of a spectacle, the sensational and pornographic violence, and the 
domination of the victims through the representations. Aimé Césaire takes 
part in this conversation of ethical representations but does so specifically in 
the context of colonization. In the epigraph of Notebook of a Return to My 
Native Land he warned against the pitfalls of representations of violence, 
“most of all beware, even in thought, of assuming the sterile attitude of the 
spectator, for life is not a spectacle, a sea of grief is not a proscenium, a man 
who wails is not a dancing bear.” Césaire does not simply warn those who 
portray suffering, but he speaks directly to the reader and thus cautions us 
all to be careful as we read the stories or see the images. He places the 
responsibility to avoid the objectification and dehumanization of victims, 
and the creation of a spectacle of the horrific events on the reader and not 
only the person who has portrayed the violence. Ethical representation of 
violence not only considers accuracy, efficacy, and how the violence is 
portrayed- avoiding degradation, or the point of the view of the author or 
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artist- but also how the viewer is encouraged or discouraged to relate to and 
interact with the information given. 
The important step taken by Jaar to force a closer, more active 
relationship of the viewer with the representation of genocide parallels 
Courtemanche’s treatment of the Rwandan genocide in his hybrid text Un 
dimanche à la piscine à Kigali. Jaar places the onus on the viewer as an 
expression of ethical representation and begs the ethical spectatorship of the 
viewer. Likewise, Gil Courtemanche, a Canadian journalist who was in 
Rwanda during the genocide and who wrote a hybrid text mixing 
journalistic account with a fictional novel, implicates the reader, often that of 
a western audience, to interact directly with the text and take a more active 
role in the witnessing of the violence that occurred. Gil Courtmanche takes 
advantage of his profession as journalist in order to create a hybrid text, both 
fiction and first-hand account, that surpasses the actual events of the 
genocide and creates a narrative space in which no one escapes the guilt or 
the violence experienced in Rwanda.  
In a warning to the reader in his preamble, Courtemanche discusses 
the hybridity of his novel and also testifies to the veracity of his report. He 
warns the readers not to assume that the descriptions of the violence and 
cruelty are embellished for effect: 
Ce roman est un roman. Mais c’est aussi une chronique et un 
reportage. Les personnages ont tous existé et dans presque tous les 
cas j’ai utilisé leur véritable nom. Le romancier leur a prêté une vie, 
des gestes et des paroles qui résument ou symbolisent ce que le 
journaliste a constaté en les fréquentant.15  
This novel is fiction. But it is also a chronicle and eye-witness 
report. The characters all existed in reality, and in almost every case 
I have used their real names. The novelist has given them lives, acts 
and words that summarize or symbolize what the journalist 
observed while in their company.16  
These guidelines for the reader help to avoid the emotional and moral 
distancing that can occur when the atrocities of reality seem more like a 
horror film. However, in order to do justice to the events and victims, and 
have the possibility of preventing similar atrocities in the future, it is 
important that the reader/spectator does not allow the events to transform 
into the imaginary like a scary nightmare. Courtemanche stayed faithful to 
the actual stories and events, a task which has also helped him to 
comprehensively demonstrate the complexity of the situations and the 
people involved and encouraged the reader to stay in the discomfort of an 
unfortunate truth.  
He offers an example of an ethical representation of the terrifying 
events in part because he presents the crimes as committed both by and 
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against humanity as a whole, including the reader. He does not further 
perpetuate the racial stereotypes of Africans: either savage killer or 
worthless victim. Courtemanche refuses to further degrade the victims or to 
simplify the situation to make it seem like fictional horror, both of which 
would allow the reader to detach himself from the cruel reality. Instead, 
Courtemanche actually chooses to use voyeuristic literary strategy in order 
to implicate the reader in accusations against a world that failed in its 
response to the Rwandan genocide and to include the reader among the 
violated victims.  
Courtemanche also wrote the screenplay for the movie version of his 
text, Un dimanche à Kigali, yet it lacks many of the aspects of that make the 
text an ethical representation. Because of the visual aspect a film brings, the 
film is necessarily much less explicitly violent than the novel. The result is 
the removal of the voyeuristic scenes that incriminate the reader, and that 
require the active participation of the reader, both of which are important in 
ethical representations. Also, the film does not give space for the voices of 
the victims to come through and tell their own stories. The audience hears 
about SIDA and Methode through the lens of Valcourt’s camera after 
Methode’s death rather than through Methode’s own words coming from a 
place of strength. Also in the film, the audience witnesses the atrocities 
Gentille faced through flash-backs as the camera reflects what Valcourt is 
learning about what happened to her. Whereas in the text, Gentille tells her 
own story in a journal; despite the torture and violation she endured she has 
the strength to testify to the experiences, which guards her subjectivity 
rather than portraying her as simply the object of violence. Courtemanche 
succeeds in ethically representing the genocide in numerous ways in his text 
that unfortunately do not translate to the screen. The visual element 
produced a large challenge, as did shortening the text to fit into a feature 
length film. For these reasons, as well as the fact that a film automatically 
leans towards a more passive role of the viewer, I have chosen to focus on 
the text version as part of the discussion on audience participation as a 
necessary part of  ethical representations of genocide.  
The film version of Un dimanche highlights some of the challenges with 
actually seeing representations of violence, and Schnyder and Toudoire-
Surlapierre, in Voir et Être Vu, further elaborate on this by discussing the 
connection between seeing and dominating. They posit that the viewer 
possesses a desire to destroy the object seen. The spectator’s urge to look is 
based on a need for knowledge, which is connected to a desire to dominate 
and termed scopophilia. Schnyder and Toudoire-Surlapierre assert that this 
scopophilial desire leads to the destruction of the image. If domination 
stems from knowledge as discussed above, then the reader of Un dimanche 
also dominates over the victims because of his/her voyeuristic behavior, 
which has permitted him/her to possess intimate, shameful, degrading, and 
objectifying knowledge about the characters in the film. What is more 
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powerful, though, is that the characters represent real people who were 
victims of the atrocities of the genocide. Schnyder discusses the tyrannical 
potential of the unbalanced gaze towards the “Other” by emphasizing the 
power one has when having the privileged position of knowledge through 
the gaze. Kelly Oliver, in Witnessing: Beyond Recognition, explains the 
relationship between knowledge, sexuality and domination in an apt way:   
The instinct for mastery is nonsexual, [but] can fuse with sexuality 
secondarily to become sadism. Freud describes the instinct for 
knowledge and the instinct for mastery in terms of opposites 
activity/passivity; the aim of the instinct for mastery is actively to 
dominate or to destroy the object.17  
Due to this complex relationship between the gaze, knowledge, and 
domination Courtemanche’s readers are unavoidably implicated in the 
genocide because they are complicit to the violence being done to the 
characters, and thus they are part of the failure of humanity. Henceforth, the 
reader cannot maintain an outside position of judgment of the events. Thus, 
the text gives back the humanity to its characters that had been lost to the 
degrading violence, erasure of personal and collective history, and the 
obscene and sensationalized images.  
Another area in which Courtemanche succeeds in his representation is 
by debunking the commonly held ideas that perpetrators of genocide are 
either monsters or savages and that the victims are helpless in need of 
Western saviors. These are both stereotypical images of not only the Hutu 
aggressors in the Rwandan genocide but also Africans and colonized people 
in general. This objectification in media is similar to the objectification of 
people discussed by Aimé Césaire in his discourses on colonization. He 
states that “radical objectification manifests as […] contempt, mistrust, 
arrogance and degraded masses” and allows for “the irrational other [to be] 
devalued, abused, erased, or exterminated.”18 If media representation 
perpetuates the negative impression of the people in question, it also 
contributes to the abuse they experience by propagating a lack of concern 
and self-complacency of the Western viewers, or even just by further 
degrading the victims themselves. Not only does he refuse to adhere to these 
stereotypes, Courtemanche actually succeeds in demonstrating how 
genocide is linked to the perceived superiority of one group to another that 
can come from these labels of inferiority. This is achieved by a narrative that 
illustrates that no group, person or country is outside of blame for similar 
ways of thinking. The characters in Un dimanche à la piscine à Kigali aptly 
demonstrate the universality of prejudice, the desire for power, and the 
perception of superiority, all of which lead to the violence that was seen in 
Rwanda.19  
The stereotypes of helpless African in need of a savior, or aggressive, 
monstrous African, for instance, make up what is known as cultural 
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violence, a concept coined by Johan Galtung in his essay entitled Cultural 
Violence. He explains that cultural violence is an invariant, which makes 
direct and structural violence look, even feel, right - or at least not wrong. 
Indeed, one of the reasons that genocide can occur is because the victims are 
dehumanized and made into animals, objects, villains, and enemies. Given 
that these ways of thinking bring about, or at the very least legitimize such 
violent behaviors, it is absolutely necessary to avoid the perpetuation of 
such beliefs, which allow for people to become objects and thus held outside 
the standards of moral treatment. Un dimanche à la piscine à Kigali transcends 
this reductionist depiction of genocide by complicating the roles of the 
characters to show the capacity of hatred and violence in all people. To 
further achieve this aim, he implicates international actors and even the 
reader of the novel in the genocide as well. Samantha Powers, in her article 
Bystanders of Genocide, suggests that Western prejudices towards the violent 
nature of tribal conflict in Africa contributed to the inaction of the United 
States in preventing or at least limiting the atrocities committed in Rwanda. 
Therefore, in representing the Rwandan genocide one also has to avoid the 
objectification of a group of people. Additionally, the representations must 
create a bridge between the genocidal behaviors, the implicated persons, 
and the readers who often are of Western origin. Un dimanche does just that- 
it surpasses the actual events of the genocide and creates a narrative space in 
which no one escapes the guilt or the violence experienced in Rwanda- not 
even the reader.  
Courtemanche implicates the reader in the acts of genocide in three 
powerful ways, thus engaging the reader in such a way that he cannot 
remain distant, and he is forced to consider his own prejudices and 
responsibility in the propagation of violence. One, Courtemanche focuses on 
the universality of the conditions that lead to genocidal acts such as hatred, 
prejudice, and fear and then he utilizes narrative strategies to implicate the 
reader as a voyeur who imposes his own prejudices on the characters. Two, 
he establishes the problem of inaction through the historical perspective that 
places blame on Western countries and then implicitly includes the reader in 
this group because the reader passively witnesses the atrocities through the 
detailed and gruesome lens Courtemanche offers. Three, through the role as 
voyeur of rape the reader is further implicated because he contributes to the 
humiliation and degradation of victims, thus aiding in the use of rape as a 
genocidal weapon.   
As well, Courtemanche defines the problem of the Rwandan genocide 
in universal terms to which everyone relates. He says that hate was the 
sickness that caused the slaughter to happen and that this root of genocide is 
something from which humanity in general suffers. As an example of this, 
we as readers participate in the hatred because of the way in which we 
respond to the media’s portrayal of the genocide. Our disinterest and 
contempt can be seen in our inaction towards current injustice and violence, 
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and it is even evident when we turn away from the gruesome pictures 
wondering when they will stop because we do not like how they make us 
feel. In this way we are no different from Valcourt and Raphael, two 
characters who wished that their close friend Méthode was already dead 
because they were tired of watching him suffer and wanted to continue with 
their own lives.  
Courtemanche also identifies feelings of superiority as a root to the 
problem of genocide and demonstrates that no one is outside of this problem 
of superiority, which encourages the reader to renounce any such feelings 
that could otherwise contribute to an objectification of the victims by way of 
the reader’s interactions with the text. He explains that the conflict between 
the Hutu and Tutsi had existed for centuries because of a longstanding 
battle in which both ethnic groups wanted to assert itself as superior. He 
thus insinuates that the Tutsi were actually no better than the Hutu 
murderers and thus complicates the binary roles of victim and perpetrator. 
Courtemanche also bridges the gap between the Rwandans and the Whites 
who also see themselves as superior. Courtemanche uses the opinion of 
Célestin, a Hutu, to underline the universality of feelings of superiority.  
Il avait rapidement compris que les Blancs se croyaient supérieurs. 
Cela ne le dérangeait pas. De tout temps, des individus, des clans, 
des tribus avaient promené leur supériorité proclamée sur les 
collines et dans les vallées. Certains usaient de la force, d’autres du 
commerce, pour s’affirmer, mais toujours, chacun à sa façon.20  
He quickly understood that the Belgians considered themselves 
superior. He was not upset about this discovery. From the 
beginning of time, individuals, clans, tribes had paraded their 
superiority, proclaimed it on the hills and in the valleys. Some used 
force and others used trade to assert themselves, but always, each 
in his own way and each on his own hill.21  
Once again, the similarities between people are emphasized: everyone sees 
him or herself as superior, and thus everyone is guilty of the same sin that 
has led to genocide. He forces the reader to examine the truth because he 
erases the distance between us and the victims and aggressors of the rapes 
and murders.  
Furthermore, as a Western audience, we too often passively accept the 
perceptions and point of view that we receive from representations of 
genocide in the media. These images are frequently limited to obscene, 
degrading, and objectifying perceptions that perpetuate the stereotypes 
about the evil, backward Africans who kill each other. I am not arguing that 
the images themselves are manipulated or falsified in any way. However, 
they do provide a limited view of genocide and of the people associated 
with the events, which can conceptually transform people into objects thus 
rendering the event itself a spectacle. This objectification in media is similar 
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to the objectification of people discussed by Aimé Césaire who states that 
“radical objectification manifests as […] contempt, mistrust, arrogance and 
degraded masses” and allows for “the irrational other [to be] devalued, 
abused, erased, or exterminated.”22 If media representation perpetuates the 
negative impression of the people in question, it also contributes to the 
abuse they experience by propagating a lack of concern and self-
complacency of the Western viewers, and also by further degrading the 
victims. This is fundamentally similar to the Hutu soldiers who killed their 
Tutsi neighbors and friends because they believed the propaganda that they 
were told on Rwandan radio: the root of all their problems was the Tutsis 
who were nothing more than cockroaches. Yet, unfortunately, Western 
representations of the violence that occurs in African countries, and other 
developing countries, can be little more than propaganda supporting the 
superiority of the Western world and the inferiority of Africa and Africans 
who are responsible for the genocide. Aedín Ní Loingsigh, in her article 
Lying to tell the truth: fiction and the Rwandan genocide in Véronique Tadjo’s 
L’Ombre d’Imana, states: 
Qualifications such as “savage”, “barbaric” and “senseless”, which 
were frequently used to describe the violence, pointed to a 
particular Western bias in portrayals of African identity and 
underlined a reluctance to examine events within the context of 
Rwanda’s complex history. Although the violence was frequently 
branded as incredible, it was also treated as known and inevitable, 
and consequently unworthy of much attention.23   
This explanation helps us understand that by painting a negative 
picture of a group of people the representation of violence can 
further stereotypes and can even lead to violence because 
stereotypes and prejudices in art and literature make up the 
cultural violence that legitimizes direct violence.  
Affected by these stereotypes promoted in representations of violence and 
the genocide in Rwanda, the lector reads and reacts to the detailed 
descriptions of both sex and violence through the lens of our his own biases 
and preconceptions. This voyeuristic role of the reader can thus result in 
continued objectification and degradation. However, because of the 
relationship Courtemanche has created between the reader and the text, and 
the strategies he has employed which cause the reader to question his own 
role, the reader is likely to reflect upon his role as voyeur and ultimately 
self-condemn for judgments passed rather than further continue on the path 
to objectify the victims. For example, in the scene where Méthode is living 
his last moments in the hotel room, the reader intrudes on an intimate sexual 
and emotional moment. We are the uninvited spectator who perhaps feels 
uncomfortable, aroused, or places judgment.  There are almost two pages of 
a detailed description of the sexual acts Agathe performs with and for 
Méthode before he dies. The details are intimate and, in reading them, we 
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invade the privacy of the characters and feel uncomfortable with knowing 
too much. This is especially true because Courtemanche indicated in his 
preface that the characters are based on real people. Courtemanche also 
testifies to the veracity of his report. While the sexual pleasure given to 
Méthode was watched by the friends and family, we are not friends or 
family who participate in the sacredness of the celebration. We are outsiders 
with a different set of cultural norms. We are concerned that Agathe will 
end up getting AIDS. We are uncomfortable with the fact that Méthode’s 
mother is present and even places her hand on Méthode’s stomach so that 
Agathe could more easily engage in oral sex. We may also impose beliefs 
that sexual intimacy should be enjoyed within the context of a monogamous 
relationship or in private. At the very least we wrestle with these prejudices 
as we continue to “watch” and as we place judgment upon the situation, we 
risk cheapening and degrading the sacredness of the moment and reduce it 
to pornographic.  
 Another powerful example of how narrative strategy causes the reader 
to be implicated as culpable in the atrocities of genocide, and thus more 
closely aware of the complex reality of the violence, is through the 
voyeurism in the scene where Cyprien’s wife Georgina is raped and then she 
and Cyprien are both murdered. Courtemanche pushes the boundaries of 
his text by giving a detailed account of the forced rape between Cyprien and 
his wife. So much detail is given that it actually provides the reader with the 
violent, obscene images associated with the event. With a gun to his head, 
Cyprien undresses his already violated, bloody wife. The narration 
continues with emphasis on the gentleness and delicateness with which he 
proceeds to in essence rape her. Not only is she not consenting but she has 
already been brutally beaten, her breast cut off and repeatedly raped that 
prolonging her inevitable death is itself torture. Yet Cyprien kisses the 
entirety of her body and the angry soldier attacks him with a machete. This 
does not stop him. He continues to make love to his wife, engaging in oral 
sex for the first time and Courtemanche recounts it all in detail. The reader is 
present there with the soldiers, as spectators for what should be an 
incredibly intimate moment but the experience is perverted in the context of 
such violence. Cyprien then penetrates his wife, and just before ejaculating, 
he is murdered. And again, we are witness. We have been witness to the 
whole event and did nothing but writhe in our own discomfort. In the same 
way that Courtemanche accuses the foreign world of being witness without 
having acted, the reader is now implied as a guilty bystander. 
It is not only the violent nature of rape that stole their pleasure; we 
have as well because our presence adds to the shame and humiliation and 
thus contributes to one of the goals of rape. Rape has historically been used 
as a weapon in war in order to degrade women. Arlette Farge and Cecile 
Dauphin discuss the use of rape as a weapon of war in their text De la 
violence et des femmes and attest to its historical use as a proof of the 
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inhumanity of the enemy. The women victims of rape are reduced to objects 
symbolizing domination of men and their aggressive power. Farge and 
Dauphin discuss the systematic use of rape as a weapon of war in both the 
Spanish Civil War and in former Yugoslavia and in both situations rape was 
used to humiliate and dishonor the victim, and to create a climate of terror. 
The shame associated with the rape played a significant role in the power of 
rape as a weapon in war. In the case of Georgina, she lost her breast, was 
raped by her own husband on her death bed so that she was fully stripped 
of her identity as a woman in addition to being murdered. As spectators we 
contributed to her degradation because we watched her dignity being taken 
away. Not only does Courtemanche testify to the veracity of his accounts, 
and thus this horrific rape and murder, but the gruesome details are 
representative of many real events that, as a nation, we stood by and 
allowed to occur. As reader, we must begin to examine our own 
responsibility to speak out and act against the violence that we now more 
completely understand.  
 However, as readers we are not only the aggressors who stand next to 
the soldiers and violate the victims; we are also victims to the violence of the 
text. We are forced to be among the murderers who are watching. Over and 
over again the reader is exposed to the graphic details that paint obscene 
pictures. We see the blood and tears. We feel nauseated and we lose our 
breath. The reader is physically affected by the violence described and by 
the violent nature of the language itself. The following citation, which 
describes the death seen by Valcourt on the street, demonstrates this violent 
nature of the language: “Les cadavres des hommes faisaient des taches noir 
et blanc, les seins dénudés, la culotte rose ou rouge encerclant les genoux. 
Valcourt les voyait trembler, les entendait râler et gémir.”24  “The men’s 
bodies, clothed, made black and white patches; the women’s were exposed, 
legs spread, breasts bared, pink or red underpants around their knees. Many 
were still alive. Valcourt could see them tremble and hear them rattle as they 
breathed and moaned.”25 Courtemanche purposefully includes sound and 
color to increase the visual imagery such that multiple senses of the reader 
are attacked. In this part of the citation it is the rhythm of the language that 
is so vicious. 
On tuait les hommes, d’un coup de feu ou d’un coup de machette, 
savant et précis. Mais les femmes n’avaient pas droit à une mort 
claire et nette. On les mutilait, on les violait, mais on ne les achevait 
pas, comme on l’aurait fait avec des animaux blessés. On les laissait 
aller au bout de leur sang, sentir venir la mort râle par râle, crachat 
par crachat, pour les punir d’avoir mis au monde tant de Tutsis, 
mais aussi pour les punir de leur arrogance car, à tous ces jeunes 
qui tuaient, on avait raconté que la femme tutsie se croyait trop 
belle pour eux.26  
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The men were killed skillfully and accurately with a single shot or 
machete stroke, but the women didn’t have the right to a quick, 
clean death. They were mutilated, tortured, raped, but not finished 
off as the killers would have done with wounded animals. They 
were allowed to bleed to death, to feel death coming rattle by rattle, 
gob by gob of blood-filled spit, to punish them for having brought 
so many Tutsis into the world, but also to punish them for their 
arrogance, for the young killers had been told that Tutsi women 
considered themselves too good for Hutus.27 
There are long, never-ending sentences composed of shorter phrases. This 
structure parallels the way in which the women are killed. Blow by blow, 
one form of torture after another, the women slowly meet their death. As the 
quote states, not even hurt animals would be left to suffer that way. 
However, in the case of the Rwandan genocide the women were considered 
less valuable then animals, and were treated with less respect. The style of 
writing here matches the slow, painful process of the women losing their 
lives, and with each additional phrase, the reader also feels the blows of 
hatred.    
Courtemanche breaks down the binary separation of victim and 
perpetrator, Hutu and Tutsi, African and Westerner to demonstrate a 
complexity that is closer to the reality of human existence. Courtemanche’s 
choice to implicate the reader in accusations against a world that failed in its 
response to the Rwandan genocide, and to include the reader among the 
violated victims, truly makes his work stand apart. Un dimanche à la piscine à 
Kigali succeeds in representing the horrors committed at Kigali because he 
presents them as crimes both by and against humanity as a whole and 
challenges stereotypes and fears of evil Rwandan/African perpetrators or 
helpless Rwandan/African victims that contribute to the legitimization of 
violence. In the following famous quotation Arthur Koestler brings to our 
attention the fact that language itself is a weapon that can cause much harm. 
He states, “Wars are not fought for territory, but for words. Man's deadliest 
weapon is language. He is susceptible to being hypnotized by slogans as he 
is to infectious diseases. And where there is an epidemic, the group mind 
takes over.”28 This astute explanation of wherein lies the real weapon also 
implies the possibility that acts of extreme violence could occur anywhere, 
with anyone as the antagonist. This is a concept that is maintained and 
further developed in Courtemanche’s hybrid novel. The narrator states: 
Nous pouvons tous nous transformer en assassins, avait toujours 
soutenu Valcourt, même l’être le plus pacifique et le plus généreux. 
Il suffit de quelques circonstances, d’un déclic, d’une faillite, d’un 
patient conditionnement, d’une colère, d’une déception…Chacun 
possède dans ses gènes toute le Bien et tout le Mal de l’humanité.29  
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We can all turn into killers, Valcourt had often maintained, even 
the most peaceful and generous of us. All it takes is a certain 
circumstance, something that clicks, a failing, a patient 
conditioning, rage, disappointment…All the Good and Evil of 
humanity is in our genes.30  
This notion that everyone possesses the possibility for good and evil 
reclaims the humanity in situations of genocide; the extreme violence occurs 
because of an extreme, complex situation, not because Africans, or Germans, 
Armenians or any other group are particularly evil. 
 This rejection of stereotypes and prejudice is an essential part of an 
ethical reading of representations of violence, suffering, or of marginal 
groups in general. Kelly Oliver in Witnessing: Beyond Recognition in her 
discussion of the value of witnessing as well as the potential pitfalls 
associated there within defines a responsibility and obligation of the reader 
or viewer to see an investment of oneself in another- in this context the 
victims and perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide. She extols that it is not a 
debt but rather an ethical duty to see oneself in connection with others and 
that this type of witnessing violence can avoid the potential dehumanizing 
effects that are possible. “Seeing investments in each other should prevent 
what Williams calls ‘pornographic seeing,’ which makes the other into an 
object of spectacle, there for the viewer’s pleasure, possessed by the subject’s 
gaze…Pornographic seeing denies the seer’s responsibility for seeing by 
ignoring the seer’s connection to what he sees.”31 Oliver warns against 
seeing as possessing, bearing witnessing as a way to further objectify or 
victimize and calls on the responsibility of the viewers or readers to form a 
connection and see investments in others. Such behaviors are important but 
need to be encouraged by the representations themselves. Jaar and 
Courtemanche require their audience to interact with the subject from a 
position of compassion and understanding. Not only do they pay attention 
to how they depict the genocide, but also they pay close attention to how 
they engage their audience to take responsibility for their part of the ethical 
representations.  
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